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RACE, DIGNITY, AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY 
R.A. Lenhardt* 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges1 asserts legal 
marriage’s capacity to afford same-sex couples a measure of “equal 
dignity” and belonging too long denied.2  In this Essay, I ask whether there 
is any reason to believe that marriage could do the same for African 
Americans.  Could broader entrance into marriage, as some conservatives 
suggest, provide Blacks—gay and straight—a measure of belonging that 
has been frustratingly elusive,3 even as the nation prepares to celebrate the 
one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
ratification? 
The language of Justice Kennedy’s opinion—which casts marriage as an 
“enduring bond, [through which] two persons together can find other 
freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality,” irrespective of 
sexual orientation, gender, or race—suggests that this question should be 
answered in the affirmative.4  But I am deeply skeptical of this claim.  
While I do not dispute that exclusion from legal marriage imposes real 
citizenship harms5 and celebrate the outcome in Obergefell, I am not 
convinced that access to marital rights, without more, magically cures the 
stigma, deprivation, disparate treatment, and harm that come with outsider 
status.  Indeed, marriage regulation, in some instances, could very well 
exacerbate these wrongs.6 
Even as it secures rights for LGBT Americans, Obergefell crafts a 
whitewashed version of marriage and dignity inconsistent with the actual 
experience of African Americans and other minorities with marriage.  The 
relevant history demonstrates that legal marriage in this country has, in fact, 
too often not enhanced dignity for African Americans and other minority 
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 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 2608. 
 3. See, e.g., Kay S. Hymowitz, Opinion, How Single Motherhood Hurts Kids, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/08/how-
single-motherhood-hurts-kids/?_r=0 (discussing the correlation between single motherhood 
and poverty) [http://perma.cc/4MFM-U9Z6]. 
 4. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 5. See R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy:  Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and 
the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 889–99 (2008). 
 6. See Katherine M. Franke, Opinion, Marriage Is a Mixed Blessing, N.Y. TIMES (June 
23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html [http://perma.cc/ 
8ZGW-C2E7]. 
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groups.7  Indeed, it has very often diminished black dignity and 
citizenship.8 
Even more—as recent police shootings of black men and women,9 new 
revelations about the extent of Blacks’ mistreatment in the judicial 
system,10 and growing evidence of the cumulative disadvantage and despair 
that marks African American life11 make plain—marriage, without more, is 
unlikely to secure black belonging anytime soon.  Today, Blacks are the 
most unmarried group of any in the country.12  Instead of looking for black 
dignity in marriage exclusively, I thus urge a greater focus on nonmarriage 
and greater attentiveness in law, policy, and even the advocacy efforts of 
groups such as “Black Lives Matter” to the ways in which family law 
structures, such as marriage, function to shape race—how it is defined, 
understood, and experienced—and inequality in ways that deny dignity and 
impede the flourishing of black families.13 
I.  COLOR-BLIND DIGNITY AND THE HISTORY 
OF RACE AND MARRIAGE OBERGEFELL IGNORES 
The question this Essay engages—whether marriage might be dignity 
enhancing for twenty-first century African America—is one that Justice 
Kennedy would likely find curious, if not offensive.  Although arguably not 
as hostile to considering race as others on the Court,14 he has expressed real 
skepticism about race in the past, especially where government decisions 
 
 7. See R.A. Lenhardt, Marriage As Black Citizenship?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1317, 1324–
43 (2015). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Lydia Polgreen, From Ferguson to Charleston and Beyond, Anguish About Race 
Keeps Building, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/from-
ferguson-to-charleston-and-beyond-anguish-about-race-keeps-building.html 
[http://perma.cc/77CC-MT6H]. 
 10. See generally Shaila Dewan, A Surreptitious Courtroom Video Prompts Changes in 
a Georgia Town, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/05/us/a-
surreptitious-courtroom-video-prompts-changes-in-a-georgia-town.html (detailing harsh 
treatment and incarceration of poor individuals unable to pay municipal fines and penalties) 
[http://perma.cc/9ZB3-4ZX7]. 
 11. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE MAKING OF FERGUSON:  
PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), http://s3.epi.org/files/ 
2014/making-of-ferguson-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GHF-D3DT]. 
 12. D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., NEW MARRIAGES DOWN 5% FROM 2009 
TO 2010:  BARELY HALF OF U.S. ADULTS ARE MARRIED—A RECORD LOW 8 (2011), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/12/Marriage-Decline.pdf [http://perma.cc/9FY7-
SWA7]. 
 13. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH:  HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS (2014) (arguing that the legal regulation of the family undermines the 
family). 
 14. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007), a case concerning the voluntary consideration of race as a factor in school 
assignment decisions, Chief Justice Roberts infamously asserted in his plurality opinion that 
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.” Id. at 748.  In contrast, Justice Kennedy argued in his concurrence that certain race-
conscious measures designed to combat racial isolation are permissible. See id. at 787–88 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 
1566–67 (2010) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved). 
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might be understood to classify or regard an individual on the basis of their 
racial identity.15  Indeed, in his plurality opinion in Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action,16 Justice Kennedy went so far as to suggest that, 
given the extent to which racial “lines are becoming more blurred,” race 
may simply not be as salient today, notwithstanding evidence of racial 
inequality across American society.17  Further, from a doctrinal perspective, 
he has increasingly moved away from equal protection analyses typically 
associated with race and embraced notions of liberty and dignity in 
addressing LGBT rights in cases such as Lawrence v. Texas18 and United 
States v. Windsor.19 
In Obergefell, all this translates into a color-blind conception of dignity 
that, even with Justice Kennedy’s observations about stigma, privileges an 
atomistic conception of liberty only tangentially associated with group-
based concerns.20  For example, although many of the amicus briefs 
submitted to the Obergefell Court deal with matters of race at length,21 the 
majority opinion only references it a handful of times.22  Indeed, so intent is 
Justice Kennedy on telling an affirmative story about dignity and marriage 
that he fails even to mention the denial of marriage rights to Blacks during 
slavery in his discussion of the negative “developments in law and society” 
affected by marriage.23  This omission is glaring, particularly given the 
ways in which exclusion from legal marriage helped to reaffirm Blacks’ 
slave status and to stigmatize blackness itself in ways that remain 
consequential.24 
The majority opinion does engage Loving v. Virginia25 at various 
points.26  That decision, of course, supports the “double helix”27 approach 
 
 15. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 501 U.S. at 787–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 16. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
 17. Id. at 1634. 
 18. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 19. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  Kenji Yoshino attributes this move to “pluralism anxiety.” 
See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011).  Some 
have argued that this shift effects a “constitutional displacement” rather than a reduction in 
protections. See, e.g., id. (quoting Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 
1410, 1417 (1974)).  But Russell Robinson argues that the doctrinal treatment afforded 
minorities in the equal protection context has not been as favorable as that for LGBT 
couples, who have not been required, inter alia, to satisfy requirements pertaining to animus 
applicable in race cases. See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (on file with author). 
 20. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015). 
 21. See, e.g., Brief for Legal Scholars Stephen Clark, Andrew Koppelman, Sanford 
Levinson, Irina Manta, Erin Sheley, and Ilya Somin as Amici Curiae, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574); Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Inc. and NAACP as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574). 
 22. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599, 2615, 2619. 
 23. See id. at 2595. 
 24. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in 
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 855–56 (2004). 
 25. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 26. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598–99, 2602–03. 
 27. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The “Fundamental Right” that Dare 
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (discussing the “double helix” 
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resurrected in Obergefell to the extent that it relies on both equality and due 
process-based principles in invalidating Virginia’s interracial marriage 
ban.28  Yet, the analysis ultimately renders portions of Loving somewhat 
mute.  Even Loving’s arguably most celebrated passage—which dismisses 
the Virginia interracial marriage prohibitions then in effect as “measures 
designed to maintain White Supremacy”29 and concludes that “restricting 
the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the 
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause”30—gets deployed to 
repackage the case’s focus and meaning.  Notwithstanding the fact that so 
many regard Loving as the decision that leveled the final blow to the third 
rail of the Jim Crow system,31 Justice Kennedy insists that it is not a case 
about “interracial marriage” but rather one about the “abiding connection 
between marriage and liberty” under the Due Process Clause more 
generally.32  The point here, to be clear, is not that Loving’s due process-
based holding has no meaning.  Indeed, I have elsewhere urged a greater 
focus on it.33  But, in Obergefell, the weight of that passage gets 
redistributed in a way that, rather than simply complementing the Loving 
Court’s equal protection-based holding, eclipses it. 
This sidelining of race means that the history of marriage on which 
Obergefell relies is necessarily incomplete.  In truth, inclusion within 
marriage, as I argued earlier, has not always been dignity enhancing, as 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion implies.  In a recent article, I explore the 
instrumental role that marriage has played over time in racial formation and 
in the subordination of African Americans, but also of groups such as 
Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Asian Americans.34  This and other 
research suggests that mere entrance into marriage did not dramatically 
change the status and prospects of Blacks in the postbellum period.35  For 
formerly enslaved Blacks, any dignity that rights to legal marriage 
conferred was often short lived.36  Those who chose to marry as a way of 
 
approach of intertwining conceptions of due process and equal protection in Lawrence v. 
Texas).  For more on the treatment of equality and liberty concerns in recent marriage cases, 
see Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality:  The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 
100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014); Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 123 YALE L.J. 3076 (2014). 
 28. See Lenhardt, supra note 5, at 861–66 (discussing equal protection and due process 
components of the Court’s decision in Loving). 
 29. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
 30. Id. at 12. 
 31. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 17 
(1994) (“The key sentence in Loving says that ‘the racial classifications [at issue] must stand 
on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.’” (alteration 
in original)). 
 32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
 33. See generally Lenhardt, supra note 5. 
 34. See Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1324–43. 
 35. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen:  Reconstruction Era Regulation 
of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 274–92 (1999). 
 36. For historical research on emancipated persons’ early experience with marriage 
regulation, see, e.g., LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDERED STRIFE & CONFUSION:  THE POLITICAL 
CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION (1997); MARY FARMER-KAISER, FREEDWOMEN AND THE 
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU:  RACE, GENDER & PUBLIC POLICY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 
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affirming loving relationships and attaining a measure of family integrity 
denied them during bondage quickly found that marriage offered them little 
protection from government intervention in their newly constituted 
families.37  And those more enamored of nonmarital frames for organizing 
their lives discovered that their status as freedperson gave them no freedom 
at all when it came to affairs of the heart.38  In the postbellum era, marriage 
was less an option than a command, as many formerly enslaved persons 
were coerced, forced, and even tricked into formalizing intimate 
relationships.39  Marriage laws regulated those who willingly entered into 
legal marriage, but also those unmarried persons who existed in that 
institution’s “shadow.”40 
Reconstruction era marriage laws often functioned more to reassert 
control over former slaves than to affirm their intimate choices and new 
status as citizens.41  Whites saw marriage as a way to reconstruct the South, 
as well as the nation overall.42  Officials at all levels of government thus 
devoted themselves to the goal of “creating black [households], husbands 
and wives,” using whatever means deemed necessary to ensure compliance 
with its norms.43  The goal was not to establish Blacks as a people, but to 
create the kind of citizens that served the objectives of Whites—those who 
were sexually and gender compliant and, who could, perhaps most 
importantly, internalize the tremendous dependency that many freedpersons 
had upon emerging from slavery.44  Those who could not meet these 
expectations often faced harsh punishments.45  For example, destitute 
fathers unable to satisfy nineteenth century expectations for supportive 
husbands quickly found themselves imprisoned and their children 
involuntarily placed in “apprenticeships” that, not surprisingly, replicated 
the labor arrangements of slavery.46 
 
(2010); NORALEE FRANKEL, FREEDOM’S WOMEN:  BLACK WOMEN AND FAMILIES IN CIVIL 
WAR ERA MISSISSIPPI (1999); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT:  WAGE 
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); Franke, 
supra note 35, at 308. 
 37. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1337. 
 38. See FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 91. 
 39. See STANLEY, supra note 36, at 45–46; Franke, supra note 35, at 296; see also 
Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1327–28.  Some states moved so quickly to institute black 
marriage as a form of social control that some former slaves had no idea that they had been 
married. See Franke, supra note 35, at 277 (discussing, inter alia, Mississippi law that 
deemed Blacks “who do now and have heretofore lived and cohabited together as husband 
and wife” to be deemed married as a matter of law); see also Civil Rights Act of 1865, ch. 4, 
§ 3, 1865 Miss. Laws 82. 
 40. See Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage:  Single Women and the Legal 
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1656 (2003). 
 41. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1327. 
 42. Id. at 1326–28. 
 43. Id.; Franke, supra note 35, at 302. 
 44. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1327. 
 45. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 80–87 (discussing use of vagrancy laws to 
penalize noncompliance with marital obligations); Franke, supra note 35, at 296–97 
(discussing role of courts in imposing punishment for noncompliance with marriage norms). 
 46. See Mary Farmer-Kaiser, “With a Weight of Circumstances Like Millstones About 
Their Necks”:  Freedwomen, Federal Relief, and the Benevolent Guardianship of the 
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Over time, marriage as an institution worked in ways that primarily 
served to marry African Americans—those who are married, as well as 
those who are not—to second-class citizenship.47  A full exploration of all 
the ways in which this has been true is not feasible in this Essay.  But I have 
argued that an institutional structure analysis would reveal the long reach of 
marriage regulation in structuring black disadvantage and segregation.48  
Just take the single example of Jim Crow era statutes that incorporated 
antimiscegenation laws as a way of determining where a student might 
attend school or, even more, where an individual might live.49  To the 
extent that such segregation templates still undergird zoning decisions and 
policy, we can understand them to provide concrete support for the notion 
that marriage has not only functioned as a mechanism for racial 
subordination, but that it has done so in ways that have disproportionately 
affected the wealth and opportunity structures of countless Blacks.50  
Research shows not only that the housing options open to Blacks are 
different than those for other groups, but that this difference has 
implications for access to education, transportation, and a host of other 
benefits.51  In other words, marriage regulation, through its broad and often 
troubling reach into areas as diverse as education, housing, child welfare, 
public benefits, and even voting, has been instrumental in structuring race 
and disadvantage in this country.52 
II.  MARRIAGE AS DIGNITY ENHANCING TODAY?:  
WHY BOTH MARRIAGE DECLINE AND “BLACK LIVES MATTER” 
Marriage simply has not had a lot to do with the recognition or 
affirmance of black dignity historically.53  Nevertheless, could it be dignity 
 
Freedmen’s Bureau, 115 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 412, 428–29 (2007); Franke, supra 
note 35, at 285 n.167. 
 47. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1327, 1335. 
 48. Id. at 1335–43. 
 49. See, e.g., FRANKLIN JOHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION 
CONCERNING THE FREE NEGRO 158–59 (1918) (citing North Carolina law that based the right 
to attend a particular school on antimiscegenation law); City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 
712, 713 (4th Cir. 1930) (invalidating Richmond law that based eligibility to live in a 
neighborhood on antimiscegenation law). 
 50. See Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1338–40. 
 51. See David Leonhardt, Middle-Class Black Families, in Low-Income Neighborhoods, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/upshot/middle-class-
black-families-in-low-income-neighborhoods.html?_r=0 (discussing a recent report on race 
and housing) [http://perma.cc/34EH-6H3Y]; see also DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING 
RACISM:  HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014). 
 52. See Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1338–43.  For examples concerning public benefits 
and voting, see Melinda Chateauvert, Framing Sexual Citizenship:  Reconsidering the 
Discourse on African American Families, 93 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 198, 198 (2008) (discussing 
voting rights denial based on belief that black man fathered child out of wedlock); Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring:  Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure As the Revival 
of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1653 (2005) (discussing marriage promotion 
designed to reduce welfare reliance). 
 53. Some might argue that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), provides a notable 
exception. But see Yoshino, supra note 27, at 3078–80 (discussing Bruce Ackermann’s view 
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enhancing today?  Notably, public disclosure on race typically occurs in the 
register of equality, not dignity.  The Supreme Court, for its part, has yet to 
develop a robust doctrinal language for talking about dignity in the context 
of race.  Current race jurisprudence privileges a paper-thin, hyper-
formalistic notion of equality, one preoccupied with the treatment of 
“innocent” Whites and essentially disinterested in the dehumanizing effects 
of racial discrimination and disadvantage on African Americans and other 
minorities.54 
It has taken the demands of activists associated with the “Black Lives 
Matter” movement and other groups to clear meaningful space to talk about 
issues of dignity and race today.55  Outrage over the senseless, inhumane 
shooting deaths of African Americans such as Michael Brown and Rekia 
Boyd has not just focused important attention on our broken criminal justice 
system, it has also raised new consciousness about the “devaluation of the 
black body”56 and isolating, stigmatizing, and degrading effects of the 
racial disadvantage and segregation that the Supreme Court has long 
dismissively described as mere “societal discrimination.”57  It seems that, 
for now at least, how African Americans actually live their lives now 
matters to a growing segment of the population. 
Investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice, non-profit institutions, 
and scholars into events in places like Ferguson, Missouri have begun to 
connect the dots between black inequality and the black deaths that have 
increasingly been at the forefront of public discourse in recent months.58  
We have the beginning of a national narrative about race and cumulative 
disadvantage that increasingly makes sense of inequality markers such as 
high black incarceration rates, segregated housing, and huge gaps in black 
and white wealth.59  Yet, none of this changes the fact that, in the near term, 
marriage just is not likely to advance black dignity or citizenship more 
broadly. 
On the numbers, as I have already discussed, marriage increasingly has 
less and less to do with the lives of most Blacks.  African Americans are 
likely to hold the title of the least married group in the country for some 
 
that Loving constitutes a misstep insofar as the Court failed to address the adverse effects of 
the “institutionalized humiliation” achieved through antimiscegenation law). 
 54. See generally Elise C. Boddie, The Sins of Innocence in Standing Doctrine, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 297 (2015). 
 55. See Claudia Rankine, The Condition of Black Life Is One of Mourning, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE (June 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/magazine/the-condition-of-
black-life-is-one-of-mourning.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/XQV3-GD88]. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). 
 58. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 42–62 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/ 
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/CV46-
MJR8]. 
 59. See, e.g., id. See generally ROITHMAYR, supra note 51; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11; 
Elise C. Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Lenhardt, 
supra note 14. 
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time to come.60  Marriage decline affects all groups, as the fact that the 
percentage of married Americans fell from 72 to 52 percent between 1960 
and 2010 suggests.61  But declines have been steepest in African America:  
in 2008, Black marriage rates stood at merely 32 percent, down from 61 
percent in 1960.62  Although, as with other groups, marriage rates are 
lowest among the poor and those with low levels of educational 
attainment,63 “[B]lacks in all educational groups [are] less likely to be in 
intact marriages.”64 
Even more, however, research in this area suggests that structural 
inequality, as well as the norms associated with marriage itself, prevent or 
at least discourage many African Americans from marrying.  African 
Americans consistently rate marriage as important and are very likely to 
express a desire to marry in the future.65  But research by Kathryn Edin and 
Maria Kefalas suggests that many poor Blacks may “avoid marriage not 
because they think too little of it, but because they revere it.”66  
“Uncertainty” and fears about not fulfilling traditional marriage roles seem 
to prevent low-income, black heterosexual couples from actually 
marrying.67  The belief that “to . . . do [marriage] ‘right,’” they must be on a 
“solid economic footing,”68 may lead some Blacks to decouple childbirth 
and marriage.  In other words, structural inequality in areas such as housing, 
employment, education, and mass incarceration works in ways that keep 
marriage out of reach for many poor Blacks.  “For poor [b]lack women, [in 
particular,] socioeconomic circumstances translate into very high levels of 
‘uncertainty’ in their intimate . . . lives”69 and may even be a barrier to 
finding an appropriate partner.70 
Marriage today reflects black inequality.  What is arguably most 
devastating where that institution’s ability to affirm the dignity of black 
loving relationships is concerned, however, is that marriage and other 
 
 60. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 61. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES (2010) 
[hereinafter DECLINE OF MARRIAGE], http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-
social-trends-2010-families.pdf [http://perma.cc/B7LK-2HZA]. 
 62. Id. at 9 (comparing the “Current Marital Status” of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics). 
 63. See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS:  HOW 
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); see also INST. FOR AM. VALUES & 
NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS:  WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS:  THE 
NEW MIDDLE AMERICA 54–55 (2010) [hereinafter WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS]. 
 64. WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS, supra note 63, at 54. 
 65. Id. at 134. 
 66. See KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP:  WHY POOR WOMEN 
PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 207 (2005). 
 67. LINDA C. MCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES:  FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 138–41 (2006). 
 68. Id. at 140–41. 
 69. Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 1351 (citing Linda M. Burton & M. Belinda Tucker, 
Romantic Unions in an Era of Uncertainty:  A Post-Moynihan Perspective on African 
American Women and Marriage, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 136–39 
(2009) (describing the problem of “uncertainty” and its impact on the marriage choices of 
Blacks)). 
 70. Kristen Harknett & Sara S. McLanahan, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Marriage 
After the Birth of a Child, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 790, 804, 808 (2004). 
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family law structures also shape such inequality, not to mention race itself.  
Elsewhere, I have offered personal examples from my work as a legal 
scholar who writes and teaches about race and family to support this 
assertion.71  For more objective proof, however, we need only look at one 
of the tragic incidents at the heart of the “Black Lives Matter” movement:  
the shooting death of Walter Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina. 
Scott was shot in the back after running away from a police officer after a 
seemingly routine traffic stop for a broken tail light.72  The world focused 
on a death that might otherwise have gone unnoticed because a bystander 
used his cell phone to secretly record Scott’s shooting by Officer Michael 
T. Schlager with a cell phone.73  For the purposes of this Essay, however, 
the reason that Scott apparently ran is far more important.  News reports 
suggest that an outstanding warrant to pay eighteen thousand dollars in back 
child support led to his ultimately fatal efforts to evade possible arrest.74  
Having already been incarcerated and consequently lost a job for a similar 
inability to pay support, Scott was desperate to avoid having to bear the 
dual indignity of going to jail for unpaid child support and then losing 
another job because of it.75  Our mechanisms for securing child support 
payments nationwide have a disparate impact on African American men, 
who are more likely to be unemployed and to be incarcerated than their 
non-minority peers.76  States seek child support from married and 
unmarried parents alike.77  Nevertheless, we can understand such 
obligations at least to be informed by marital norms privileging patriarchy, 
support, and the internalization of dependency.78  Existing law—to include 
Obergefell’s implicit assumption that unmarried families are, as a 
normative matter, somehow both less deserving of respect and central to the 
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fabric of society79—privileges marriage in ways that render it both overly 
punitive and insufficiently attuned to the needs of the poor and unmarried.80  
This is probably nowhere more true than in the case of black, nonmarital, 
female-headed households, which are disproportionately affected by such 
laws.81 
With the Princeton and Columbia University-affiliated Fragile Families 
and Child Wellbeing Study—which follows 5000 children born in U.S. 
cities between 1998 and 2000 and their families—we now have more 
information about nonmarital or “fragile” families of all backgrounds.82  
Such families, unsurprisingly, are overwhelmingly likely to be 
disadvantaged.83  As a group, the women who primarily head such 
families—whether single, cohabiting, or living without a partner—tend to 
live in poverty and to have far fewer socioeconomic resources than their 
married peers.84  But, nonmarital black families tend to be the most fragile 
of the fragile.85 
Black women in fragile families face tremendous degrees of 
“uncertainty” in areas such as employment and housing.86  For example, 
they are more likely to live below or near the poverty line than their white 
counterparts.87  They are also more likely to be recent recipients of public 
assistance and to describe their neighborhood as unsafe.88  Finally, although 
they are more likely to live apart from romantic partners even if a 
relationship survives post-birth, black women are more likely to have 
additional children.89  The chances that black women will marry after the 
birth of a child are only about 9 percent.90 
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The tremendous inequality that fragile black families confront 
compounds the disparate effects that family law structures—i.e., those 
regulating matters ranging from marriage to child custody to welfare to tax 
benefits—have on nonmarital family units.  Indeed, the primacy of marriage 
as a regulatory device today means that family-related laws persist in 
marrying Blacks to second-class status.  Tax policy that incentivizes 
marriage by extending benefits only to married couples rather than 
nonmarital individuals provides a noteworthy example of this problem.91  
State-imposed caps on welfare benefits under the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program provides another.92  Welfare cap 
programs limit the economic support that families bearing additional 
children while on public assistance can receive.93  As Jill Hasday explains, 
this “impose[s] an extreme financial hardship” on poor families, especially 
those that qualify as fragile families in which multipartner fertility often 
results and tends to result in family dissolution.94 
TANF-based durational limits on welfare support stand as another 
window into this problem.  Under those provisions, poor women are 
mandated to enter the workforce within a certain period95 to end the 
dependency many wrongly believe that public assistance creates.96  In the 
absence of meaningful support for childcare, however, these changes 
disproportionately affect women of color, who are overrepresented among 
recipients of welfare.97  As suggested by the tragic story of a black mother 
recently prosecuted because she was so desperate for employment that, 
when her childcare fell through, she briefly left her young children in the 
car while she interviewed for a job,98 durational limits and other similar 
policies significantly limit the capacity of single mothers to care for and 
support their families.99  Their disparate racial impact raises serious 
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concerns, just as the racially discriminatory practices discussed in Part I 
did.100 
III.  NONMARRIAGE AS DIGNITY ENHANCING? 
African America, as I have previously noted, has never fully interrogated 
the assumption—implicit in national law and policy, but also its own 
narratives about family life—that black marriage “is at the foundation of all 
our rights.”101  And perhaps because this is true, we have never fully 
considered the ways in which family law structures such as marriage 
contribute to racial inequality.  The time to consider such issues is long 
overdue and—insofar as anguish over recent police shootings and the 
massacre of black worshippers by white supremacist Dylan Roof earlier this 
summer now seems to flow across wide numbers of communities102—could 
not be more opportune. 
In effect, traditional marriage has limited our thinking and imagination 
with respect to matters of race, dignity, and citizenship.103  While family 
demographics have changed dramatically since 1965, proposals for 
grappling with the structural inequality that increasingly limits the choices 
and opportunities of nonmarital black families generally have not.  
Conservatives still emphasize marriage as the way to solve African 
America’s problems, despite documented doubts about its ability to single-
handedly address black need—or, increasingly, the needs of many non-
Blacks.104  Others now urge birth control and a delay in childbearing until 
economic security can be achieved.105  Yet, it seems clear that, without real 
attention to the inequality that destabilizes black communities, most black 
parents will never achieve the goal of economic security.  What is needed is 
a fundamental rethinking and restructuring of existing law and policies 
concerning nonmarital families. 
Demographics and the growing fragility of black loving relationships 
demand a greater focus on nonmarriage.  Our entire policy focus should not 
be on eliminating such families, as urged by the popularly named Moynihan 
Report—former U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s infamous and still 
hotly debated exegesis on race, nonmarital black families, and 
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citizenship.106  Rather, I recommend an inquiry into the potential for 
nonmarriage to secure black belonging.  In suggesting that we explore 
supporting nonmarital black families where they stand, rather than trying to 
convert them into marital families, I do not advocate the abolition of 
marriage.107  Instead, the proposal I advance imagines situating 
nonmarriage alongside marriage as a framework for loving black 
relationships.  This shift in focus could generate critical support for 
nonmarital black families, improving their economic situation and overall 
standing in the broader community.  The goal would be to ensure the 
“flourishing” of all black families, not to pathologize those who, either by 
choice or because of the structural inequality they confront, never enter 
traditional marriage.108 
Elsewhere, I consider proposals generated by family law scholars that, if 
structured with an eye toward race, might provide a platform for real 
change.109  Here, I will simply underscore that a critical piece in moving 
forward will be eliminating the marriage myopia of existing law and policy.  
Clare Huntington, for example, has advocated the development of a 
“postmarital family law” with new norms and rules that better aid 
nonmarital families navigating the challenges and poverty that they face.110  
Revisions to federal and state programs regulating families will also be 
imperative. 
For example, President Obama’s January 2015 State of the Union 
Address included proposals to expand child care and open access to Head 
Start and universal preschool.111  These proposals hold concrete benefits for 
nonmarital black families, as do initiatives that would increase the number 
of workers benefitting from the protection of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (and similar state laws), and modifying federal tax policy would as 
well.112  Proposals to restructure the Earned Income Tax Credit for the poor 
could similarly improve the financial health and overall functioning of such 
families.113 
Finally, recognizing the resiliency and strengths of nonmarital families 
will also be critical.  Too often policy interventions begin with an 
assumption that nonmarital families possess only “weaknesses” and no 
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strengths.114  But reinforcing some of the strategies that such families 
deploy in scaling uncertainty in areas such as housing, food security, 
employment, and often complex relational ties could be very beneficial.  
For example, research indicates that black nonmarital families navigate the 
challenges of co-parenting and multipartner fertility better than some other 
groups.115  Black men, in particular, do better than their white counterparts 
at maintaining ties with nonresident children.116  Developing programs that 
exploit these and other strengths, and focusing on generating new capacities 
in this realm, could be very beneficial. 
These and other suggestions for better supporting nonmarital black 
families and ensuring that they are not left to shoulder the burden of 
dependency and cumulative disadvantage alone could be beneficial to all 
families, but especially those that are “fragile” and black.  While many of 
the benefits are economic in nature, the ideas explored here could generate 
positive effects in other areas as well.  Among other things, developing 
nonmarital alternatives for family support would, as I have argued in other 
work, reframe notions of race, gender, and family-based citizenship 
overall.117  Incorporating nonmarriage into family law and policy could—
insofar as African Americans are likely to be the most unmarried group in 
the country for some time to come—dramatically change the standing of 
Blacks in American society.118  They might, in other words, begin to secure 
a measure of belonging that has not hitherto been forthcoming. 
CONCLUSION:  THE PLACE OF DIGNITY AND FAMILIES  
IN THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell should be celebrated 
for the triumph of love and law that it represents.  But we should guard 
against becoming complacent in its wake.  Merely having access to 
marriage rights is not likely to afford LGBT individuals of any race the 
legal protections and belonging to which they are entitled. 
We are now one hundred and fifty years beyond the moment when the 
guarantee of freedom from bondage became manifest and the period in 
which many Blacks gained access to legal marriage.  Yet, this country has 
still not resolved the issues of race and citizenship that animated debates at 
that time.  Our discourse about race, in many ways, replicates the 
conversations conducted then and in subsequent years.  Notably, the 
debates about race and marriage today are almost identical to those we had 
fifty years ago, when the Moynihan Report was released.119 
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Fortunately, the national conversation about race that has been sparked 
by recent events and the grassroots organizing of “Black Lives Matter” and 
other groups holds great promise, notwithstanding the recent complaints of 
conservatives.120  It has brought a much needed focus on black dignity and 
its relationship to racial inequality.  We must continue to address the 
criminal justice concerns highlighted by the deaths of Michael Brown and 
others, as well as inequality in areas such as housing, education, and 
employment.  But we cannot stop there. 
This Essay has urged an added focus on marriage and other family-
related systems that help to structure race.  Family law-related institutions, 
systems, and policies intersect with other forms of disadvantage in ways we 
often fail to appreciate.  We need to begin to think of institutions such as 
marriage in the same way that we do segregated schools and housing.  I fear 
that, if we resist understanding laws and policies concerning families as a 
key instrument in structuring race and inequality, the quest for black dignity 
and equal citizenship will always be elusive.  The place of black families—
whether marital or nonmarital, same- or opposite-sex—in our society is as 
important a civil rights issue as any facing African America today.121 
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